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V O R W O R T
Eine Reihe lateinamerikanischer Länder hat in den vergangenen Jahren ernste politische
und wirtschaftliche Krisen durchlaufen. Damit ist einerseits die Attraktivität lateiname-
rikanischer Standorte für ausländische Investoren gesunken. Andererseits kann die Krise
eine gute Gelegenheit bieten, kostengünstig in den Markt einzutreten. Die Inter-
American Development Bank  (IADB) hat zur Reaktion ausländischer Direktinvestoren
auf die verbreitete krisenhafte Entwicklung eine vergleichende Untersuchung für euro-
päische Herkunftsländer durchgeführt. Der vorliegende Report  ist eine leicht überar-
beitete Fassung des deutschen Beitrags zu diesem Projekt. Er lässt eine deutlich rück-
läufige Rentabilität deutscher Engagements in der Region erkennen, allerdings keinen
massiven Rückzug deutscher Investoren. Die Strukturuntersuchung zeigt eine bemer-
kenswert stabile Konzentration auf die großen Länder mit besonders großem Zuwachs
in Mexiko und auf wenige Sektoren bei anhaltender Dominanz der Automobilindustrie.
Der Autor dankt der Deutschen Bundesbank für die Bereitstellung detaillierter Direktin-
vestitionsdaten und der IADB für die Genehmigung zur Veröffentlichung als HWWA-
Report.
Hamburg, im Dezember 2004 Konrad Lammers7
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1 REGIONAL TRENDS IN GERMAN FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT
The internationalization of German firms has progressed rapidly in recent years. Since 1998,
the last year covered by the previous Inter-American Development Bank study (Jungnickel
and Shams 2001), total German outward FDI stock has more than doubled and the number of
foreign affiliates has increased by more than 15 percent to 33,600 in 2001, while the number
of German investors (8,900) has not changed significantly. At the end of 2001, German firms
employed roughly 4.6 million employees abroad.
1
The development of foreign operations of German firms has been roughly in line with the in-
ternationalization process of firms from other high-income countries (UNCTAD 2003a).
However, the regional structure of German FDI has continued to differ substantially from the
international average. While developing countries (including China) have attracted a large
share of worldwide FDI since the late 1990s (roughly one-third), the traditionally much lower
share of German FDI in these countries further decreased, from about 10 percent to a 8 per-
cent (Figure 1). This was largely caused by a further decline in the already low share of Latin
Figure 1: Worldwide and German FDI in Latin America and other Developing Coun-
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Source:  UNCTAD (2003 b); Deutsche Bundesbank (2003 a); author’s calculations.
                                                
1  This figure excludes persons employed with subcontractors and small affiliates below the threshold qualify-
ing for inclusion in the FDI statistics as well as affiliates with less than 10 percent of German capital.10
America, which stands at 5 percent of all German FDI, compared with 10 percent of world
FDI. German firms thus continue, within their limited operations in developing countries, to
put relatively much more weight on Latin American locations, but this weight is decreasing.
In the following, we first ask in which respect investment conditions in Latin America have
changed in recent years (part 2) and which adjustment options and strategies are available to
foreign investors (part 3). The following parts 4 and 5 analyze profitability of German affili-
ates and the actual reaction in terms of regional operations in Latin America in general (part
5) and with respect to individual sectors (part 6). In part 7, the new trend towards networking
Latin American operations  is investigated. Part 8 concludes.
2 CHANGED INVESTMENT CONDITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA ?
In the discussion on recent foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America, it is important to
take into account the nature and extent of the economic crisis in the region in the 1990s. Were
the elements that made up the crisis important factors in foreign investors’ decisions about
where to locate? Did the crisis affect all Latin American countries in the same way? Political
uncertainty and unrest mean higher risk for potential and established investors, property
rights, and returns to the home country. These factors affect investment in general and in par-
ticular discourage foreign investors that are less familiar with local circumstances. However,
if the crisis manifests itself largely in domestic financial disturbances, foreign investment
might do well as long as products are sold abroad and the investment does not depend on lo-
cal finance. If the crisis affects only a few countries, investment perspectives might even im-
prove in other Latin American countries. Countries compete with each other for FDI, which is
needed for upgrading their domestic economies.
FDI locations in Latin America compete with other locations both within the region and else-
where. If other locations around the world manage to improve investment conditions substan-
tially, Latin America’s relative position could worsen, regardless of whether the economic
crisis affected FDI in the region. Thus, Latin America’s receding share of total FDI cannot
(fully) be assigned to the crisis.
Indeed, the earlier drying up of capital flows to emerging economies in the aftermath of the
crises in Asia and Russia, and the more recent global slowdown seem to have triggered the
crisis in Latin America. However, the characteristics of the crisis varied across countries, and
some, such as Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, were affected only temporarily. At the other extreme,11
Argentina in particular was severely hit by both internal and external factors, including the
country’s long overvalued peso and the devaluation in neighboring Brazil. After the Argentine
peso was devalued in early 2002, it soon became clear that other severe internal problems had
to be tackled as well: state bankruptcy and an insolvent financial system, and modernization
of the political and social systems. The long-lasting recession with a two-digit downturn in
2002 also dragged neighboring Uruguay and Paraguay into deep recession.
The overall picture of the Latin American economies clearly mirrors the crisis: countries in
the region did not achieve growth rates in domestic production comparable to those of the
early and mid 1990s or the average for developing and transition countries (UNCTAD 2003).
With the exception of the year 2000, there has been widespread stagnation. In this regard, on
average, locations in Latin America have fallen behind in attracting FDI.
Latin American countries rely on FDI to help modernize their economies and earn foreign ex-
change. However, conditions for FDI have deteriorated compared with conditions in the re-
gion before 1998 and in locations in other parts of the world (UNCTAD 2003). Foreign in-
vestors must adjust to the changed circumstances in order to face the risks associated with the
profitability of investment and transfer of profits.
Although all the countries affected by the crisis must adjust to new conditions, there appear
differences in the attractiveness of locations in the region. FDI in Argentina, Colombia, and
Venezuela seems to encounter the largest obstacles, while FDI locations in Mexico still rank
high. Given its large domestic market, Brazil could continue to attract export-oriented FDI by
following the devaluation and successful reform measures.
3 ADJUSTMENT OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES
In response to the deterioration in investment conditions in Latin America compared with
other locations, foreign investors might manifest a distinct reaction, depending on their per-
ceptions of operations in the region. The main elements of a pessimistic or resigned strategy
would be scaling down, selling, or repatriating capital and investing in other regions.
However, an optimistic variant seems to be more interesting and more relevant in practice. In
general, experience has shown that FDI firms, unlike portfolio investors, prefer to take a long-
term view in their engagements (Mallampally and Sauvant, 1999; Nunnenkamp, 2001). The12
question then is how to keep existing operations going, adjust to changed investment condi-
tions, and exploit new opportunities that might be opened up by or during a crisis. The various
elements of adjustment include the following:
• Firms could seek to stabilize value added and employment by reducing imports of compo-
nents and increasing the local content of production;
• Firms could concentrate or relocate production to more stable or promising locations in
Latin America, and thereby benefit from trade liberalization, for example, in Mercosur;
• Firms could transfer fresh capital to Latin America in order to help their subsidiaries ride
out hard times, through intra-company loans;
• Foreign investors with access to capital could exploit new investment opportunities in the
crisis and acquire local firms, taking advantage of their low valuation and need for capital;
• In order to maintain social stability, which is an important location factor, subsidiaries
could extend their social activities.
Realization of these (and other) options would show up in FDI statistics only to a limited ex-
tent. While their relevance can best be assessed at the company level, indications of some as-
pects can be seen from the structural development of German FDI in Latin America. In this
analysis, we first review recent developments in the pattern of German FDI in Latin America
against the economic and political background in the region, and then discuss firms’ adjust-
ment strategies.
4 PROFITABILITY AND CAPITAL ADJUSTMENTS
It can be assumed that profits of affiliates go down when host countries enter into economic
or financial crisis. Then the affiliates might need to receive support from rather than pay divi-
dends to the parent company. Evidence on the profitability of German affiliates in individual
countries is scarce, and the profit statements of important firms provide mixed information.
For example, according to its Brazilian CEO, Siemens has never had a loss in Brazil (FAZ,
6.3.2003), while Volkswagen has incurred heavy losses there, over the past five years, not
least because of currency turbulence and over-investment in previous years (FAZ 22.7.2003).13
At a recent high-level Brazilian-German conference of government officials and firms en-
gaged in Latin American investment and trade, a skeptical view concerning the past seemed to
prevail, but there seemed to be confidence that reforms would be successful and lead to a
better future (FAZ 31.10.2003).
Balance of payments data on income from FDI in Latin America seem to reflect financial dif-
ficulties in the affiliates. The figures - which are volatile over time - plunged into the red for
the first time in 2002 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2003c). Instead of receiving FDI income from
Latin America, there was an outflow of €1 billion in 2002, a trend that continued in the recent
months covered by the statistics. In line with the expectations mentioned above, German par-
ent companies on balance compensated their affiliates in the region for losses incurred.
A compilation of Bundesbank FDI data on German affiliates in Latin American countries
helps in assessing their performance and the strategy of investors (Table 1). While profit data
may be to some extent arbitrarily set for strategic and tax reasons, they should mirror the gen-
eral trend, which is clearly evident.
Table 1: Profitability of German Affiliates in Latin America, 1996 and 2001, in mill. €
Sector/Region Sales Profits Profitability 
a
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001
Manufacturing
Latin America 28,614 52,322 405 -138 1.4 -0.3
Argentina 3,195 3,426 36 -274 1.1 -8.0
Chile 278 354 17 12 6.1 3.4
Brazil 17,901 19,967 82 -275 0.5 -1.4
Mexico 5,724 25,297 224 322 3.9 1.3
World 297,438 589,153 5,013 -1,249 1.7 -0.2
Non-manufacturing
Latin America 4,402 12,934 935 133 21.2 1.0
Argentina 570 1,630 25 -407 4.4 -25.0
Chile 282 708 18 -6 6.4 -0.8
Brazil 1,793 3,518 83 65 4.6 1.8
Mexico 482 2,542 18 137 3.7 5.4
World 308,901 757,963 6,600 5,976 2.1 0.8
a  Profits in percentage of sales. Negative values are losses.
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank; author’s calculations.14
Profits of manufacturing affiliates in the Latin American countries fell across the board from
1996 to 2001. There is a clear distinction between crisis-struck Argentina and Brazil, where
the affiliates on balance produced losses in 2001, and Chile and Mexico, where the setback
was rather mild. It is interesting to note, however, that losses did not occur only in Latin
America. On a worldwide scale, €5 billion in profits in 1996 turned into €1.2 billion in losses
in 2001.
Profits in non-manufacturing outnumber by far those in manufacturing, both in Latin America
and worldwide. However, profitability in services cannot readily be compared with that in
manufacturing affiliates because in a number of service industries (such as banking and insur-
ance) sales values cannot be calculated meaningfully or have little explanatory power. Even
so, the trend in Latin American countries is clearly negative, with particularly high losses in
Argentina. The seemingly better performance of Mexican affiliates has to be seen against the
background of the particularly high growth rate of operations.
The four countries in Table 1 - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico - account for roughly
75 percent of Latin American GDP, but only one-sixth of the profits of non-manufacturing af-
filiates in the region. Even allowing for the accrual of additional profits in smaller Latin
American countries other than the offshore centers, it seems that the bulk of additional profits
can be allocated to the latter group. Offshore holding companies obviously serve as profit-
allocating institutions. The informational value of the profit figures for other Latin American
countries then depends on whether offshore FDI is finally channeled to North America or
Latin America. If it were directed to Latin America, the data for individual countries would
grossly underestimate real profits, but it would be practically impossible to determine the ex-
tent of distortion in the individual country data.
To analyze this, we look at the capital structure of German FDI in Latin America. If a sub-
stantial part of FDI in the four above-mentioned Latin American countries consisted of intra-
group loans from non-German sources, there would be a high probability that affiliated hold-
ings in the Caribbean supplied this capital. Seen from the side of Latin American affiliates,
this would result in a substitution of interest payments for profits. If instead loans were largely
granted from companies in Germany, profits in Latin American offshore centers could not be
expected to accrue from loans to Latin American affiliates.
The data in Table 2 present a clear picture regarding profits in Latin American affiliates,
capital adjustment strategies, and the function of holding companies. First, the share of intra-
group loans in FDI stock has increased in all countries except Mexico since 1996. This is not15
only contrary to our expectation,
2 it also contradicts statements from business representatives.
For example, according to consultant firms, parent companies often have substituted loans to
affiliates in Latin America for capital (FAZ 31.10.2003). This would enable the affiliates to
keep their revenues in the host country instead of being obliged to regularly transfer interest
abroad. However, this does not seem to have been a dominant trend. Instead, they increased
loans, thereby probably profiting from better possibilities to transfer interest payments as op-
posed to profits. However, loans have not dominated in FDI or determined the slump in prof-
its (Argentina is an exception).
Second, more than 90 percent of intra-company loans came from German sources. This share
did not substantially change during the period of observation, which leads to the conclusion
that offshore centers do not play an important role in the supply of loans.
3
Table  2: German FDI Stock and Intra-company Loans in Latin America, 1996 and
2001, in mill. €
12 3 4 5
FDI stock Intra-company loans
Total From Germany 2 in % of 1 3 in % of 2 Sector/Region
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001
Manufacturing
Latin America 9,433 14,766 1,267 3,020 1,224 2,851 13 20 97 94
Argentina 983 1,576 166 576 155 573 17 37 93 99
Chile 128 224 12 59 12 59 9 26 100 100
Brazil 5,900 6,311 687 1,516 670 1,362 12 24 98 90
Mexico 1,826 5,499 349 643 334 640 19 12 96 100
World 89,573 175,995 20,189 45,026 17,255 32,297 23 26 85 72
Non-manufacturing
Latin America 4,453 16,524 687 2,395 661 2,206 15 14 96 92
Argentina 326 880 63 642 63 641 19 73 100 100
Chile 323 637 27 56 24 56 8 9 89 100
Brazil 1,184 1,938 230 330 223 319 19 17 97 97
Mexico 170 1,229 43 125 43 121 25 10 100 97
World 141,630 523,040 36,219 89,438 24,865 70,801 26 17 69 79
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank; author’s computations.
                                                
2  However, it seems to represent a policy generally followed by foreign investors in Brazil and other Latin
American countries, as UNCTAD (2003, p. 143) concludes from various studies (see IEDI 2003, p. 22).
3  This is in line with Rösler (2003), who points out the distorting effects of Caribbean holdings and German
firms’ U.S. affiliates investing in Latin America.16
We can therefore conclude that the profit data of Latin American affiliates are not signifi-
cantly distorted by offshore holdings (which are obviously directed more toward North
America). It seems safe to conclude that profitability in fact deteriorated fundamentally. This
might have led to a scaling down of German engagement in Latin America, which should be
visible in the statistics. If instead German investors took advantage of the possibility to ac-
quire firms at favorable prices, due to poor profitability and devaluation, FDI might have in-
creased during the crisis.
5 DECREASING WEIGHT, BUT NO MASSIVE RETREAT FROM
LATIN AMERICA
In view of the above-mentioned decreasing weight of Latin American locations (including the
Caribbean, which is not dealt with separately here), it would seem that German investors have
pulled out of Latin America. However, this conclusion would be premature. It is not sup-
ported by the following developments in the pattern of FDI:
• German FDI outflows to the region virtually collapsed (Table 2).
4 In 2002, German inves-
tors have, on balance, returned capital to Germany from Latin America. However, even
this return flow can hardly be interpreted as a retreat from Latin America. The return of
capital was largely due to short-term credit transactions with affiliates (holdings) in the
Bermuda Islands, which has little to do with FDI in Latin America. Moreover, FDI stocks
in Latin America continued to grow until 2001, the last year covered by statistics on
stocks;
• Although the number of employees
5 working directly with German-owned firms in Latin
America is about 20 percent less than in 1990, there are still more than 300,000 employees.
More importantly, the reduction took place largely in the early 1990s, and the numbers
                                                
4  Flow data are extremely uncertain for two reasons. First, they often are subject to substantial revision.
Within half a year, the Bundesbank revised German FDI flows to Latin America (and the Caribbean) in 2001
by over 20 percent downward (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003c). Second, there is volatility due to the inclusion
of short-term loans. Nevertheless, flow data, if interpreted carefully, can provide information on most recent
developments.
5  Employment figures seem to be more reliable than FDI flow data, which can be strongly influenced by stra-
tegic financing behavior.17
have not changed very much since 1998, as shown in Figure 3.
6 This does not support the
pulling-out thesis.
Figure 2: German FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990-2002



































a  The left scale represents stocks, and the right scale flows in annual averages.
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank (2003 a); Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (2003).
Thus, it seems that there has not been a general retreat of German investors from Latin
America after the crisis and stagnation that emerged around 1999. Reductions in employment
took place earlier, namely in the early 1990s when Latin American countries were in the pro-
cess of restructuring their economies. German firms were less engaged in the region from the
beginning, for example compared with U.S. or Spanish firms (Vodusek 2001). Instead, Ger-
man firms put strong emphasis on their engagement in Central and Eastern Europe and in
Asia and the Pacific, as can be seen in Figure 3.
                                                
6  Of course, one has to take into account that employment in “German” affiliates received a push by the
merger of Daimler and Chrysler; see Jungnickel and Shams (2001).18
Figure 3: Employment in German Affiliates in Latin America, Central and Eastern
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Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a).
The view that the importance of Latin America as an investment location was not fundamen-
tally affected by crisis and stagnation, at least not by 2001, is largely supported by the re-
gional distribution of German affiliates (Table 3). In general, operations in Latin America are
over-proportionately concentrated in the “big three” countries: Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.
Table 3: Latin America as an Investment Location for German Firms, 1990, 1998, and
2001
FDI stock Employees Sales
(US$ billion) (thousands) (US$ billion)
1990 1998 2001 1990 1998 2001 1990 1998 2001
World 135 390 764 2,337 3,732 4558 461 970 1,193
Developing countries (and China) 16 43 68 655 789 926 51 100 136
Latin America and the Caribbean 10 25 38 402 326 320 30 53 57
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a).
Affiliates in the three countries employ about 87 percent of the workforce in Latin American
affiliates, a share that has not changed substantially since 1999 (Table 4). This compares with
the share of these countries in Latin American GDP (including the Caribbean), which is about19
70 percent. German investors have a clear large-country bias and there has been only limited
broadening of German operations in the region recently.




Thousands Percent Thousands Percent Thousands Percent
Latin America 286 100 314 100 320 100
Big three (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) 253 88 275 88 278 87
Others (including the Caribbean) 33 12 39 12 42 13
Crisis-struck  (Argentina, Uruguay,
Brazil, Venezuela and Columbia)
214 75 209 67 208 65
Less affected (Chile, Mexico, Ecuador) 62 22 93 30 100 31
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a).
The reactions of German investors to the crisis should become visible in the development of
operations in the most affected countries - Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, and
Brazil - compared with affiliates in relatively better-off countries, such as Chile, Ecuador, and
Mexico. In the former group, aggregate employment was stable in the years until 2001.
7 In
Argentina, employment fell by about 3 percent a year, which can be considered modest given
the gravity of the crisis.
8 Employment in Brazil shrank between 1996 and 1999 and was al-
most stable thereafter.
Affiliates in the relatively less or not affected countries showed a significantly better em-
ployment record than the aggregate of crisis countries. This was largely due to the surge in
FDI in Mexico after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into opera-
tion. In addition, Daimler’s acquisition of Chrysler, including its Latin American activities,
resulted in a leap in German FDI in Mexico.
9
                                                
7  More recent statements of important investors seem to indicate that the level of employment has gone down.
VW is to dismiss 4,000 out of 25,000 employees after long-lasting labor disputes and reduced working
hours. To a certain degree, these employment cuts are compensated by job creation resulting from qualifica-
tion programs and joint efforts of VW and private and public partners to increase the attractiveness of the lo-
cations for suppliers and other investors and to promote new business ideas (SZ of 22.7.2003).
8  However, the domestic labor force in Argentina increased by about 5 percent in the same period, despite the
crisis (World Bank, 2003).
9  A counterweight to this leap later resulted from the sale of some Latin American plants when sales dropped
in the United States.20
Further indication of the FDI strategies of German investors can be obtained by breaking up
net FDI flows into new investment and disinvestment (liquidation). Annexed Table A.1 pres-
ents the data, up to 2002, excluding offshore centers. Although there were significant disin-
vestments in most of the countries, reaching a peak in 2001, these were more than compen-
sated by new investments in 30 out of 36 cases (country/year combination). There is thus no
trend toward more disinvestments in the crisis countries, with the exception of Colombia.
Substantial backflows occurred only from Argentina, reaching a little more than 10 percent of
the total stock of FDI.
At the same time, there were substantial new investments even in crisis countries and in the
most recent years. It remains unclear whether these capital flows were meant to assist existing
affiliates in hard times or to acquire new affiliates at a low price.
Altogether, it seems there were few relocations in Latin America from the most affected
countries to the least affected as a result of the crisis, compared with long-term changes
brought about by the more FDI-attractive Eastern European countries and the Asia and Pacific
region.
6 LIMITED SECTOR DIVERSITY - LACK OF NEW INVESTORS
German FDI in Latin America has traditionally been dominated by manufacturing. With 85
percent of all persons employed by German firms in the region, this dominance is clearly
stronger than in total German FDI (Table 5). In European Union host countries, where serv-
ices are in the lead in terms of employment, 47 percent of workers employed by German firms
are in manufacturing.
10 In German FDI in developing countries other than Latin America, 68
percent is in manufacturing.
Table 5: Share of Manufacturing in German FDI, 1998 and  2001, percentage of total
FDI stock Affiliate employment Affiliate sales
1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001
FDI in Latin America 63 47 87 85 84 80
Total FDI 39 25 64 59 51 43
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank; author’s calculations.
                                                
10  In terms of FDI stock, services by far outnumber manufacturing in the European Union (70 percent). In non-
Latin American developing regions, they account for about 40 percent.21
Employment in Latin American manufacturing affiliates was stable until 2001 despite the cri-
sis, whereas in other regions numbers went down. Within German manufacturing in Latin
America, the major four industries (automobiles, chemicals, electrical engineering, and me-
chanical engineering) account for more than 80 percent of all employees, compared with 54
percent in other developing countries. Due to above-average capital intensity in Latin Amer-
ica, its share measured in production values is even higher (90 percent). The weight of the
major four industries has been almost stable since the late 1990s, with the dominating auto-
mobile industry gaining what was lost in the chemicals industry.
The industry focus of German FDI varies across the host countries. Brazil has received the
largest share of almost every sector’s FDI in Latin America. In relative terms, there is a strong
concentration of mechanical engineering and jewelry, toys, and furniture, while for example
business services, trade, metal products, and chemicals are below average.
Argentina is a focus of the food and tobacco industry but has received little in mechanical en-
gineering. Trade and communications FDI has above-average weight while the prior focus on
the finance sector has vanished in recent years.
Mexico is lacking FDI in mechanical engineering, banking, and communications, but the
country has received above-average investment in the automobile industry as well as some
other industries (printing and publishing, metal products, medical and optical instruments, and
business services).
In the smaller Latin American countries, German firms have invested mostly in chemical
products (although with little vertical integration) and some service industries (such as trade,
communications, and business services).
The dominance of the four large industries has to be seen against the background of their
weight in Germany, and their FDI potential. Nevertheless, Figure 4 shows that even when
normalized by sector size, automobiles and chemicals as well as electrical engineering are by
far the industries most oriented toward production in Latin America. Moreover, automobiles
and electrical engineering report particularly strong increases in the Latin America-Germany
relation, while traditional consumer goods hardly expanded.22
Figure 4: German Manufacturing in Latin America, 1994, 1998 and 2001, percentage
of production in Germany










a  Traditional consumer goods, including textiles, clothing, leather goods, food, glass/ceramics.
Note:  The ratio for 1994 is not fully comparable with later years because of statistical reclassification, espe-
cially in electrical engineering.
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a); Statistisches Bundesamt; author’s calculations.
Both the high share of manufacturing in German FDI in Latin America (with only a few in-
dustries clearly dominating) and the stability of this pattern over time are in clear contrast to
the industry structure of German production in Central and Eastern European countries. In the
latter, the four industries with the largest shares account for only 54 percent of all German
production. After motor vehicles, the food industry (8 percent) is number two in terms of pro-
duction, ahead of engineering and chemicals (Figure 5). Furthermore, services have much
greater representation in Central and Eastern European countries than in Latin America,
thereby clearly demonstrating the advantages of these locations in terms of proximity to Ger-
many.23
Figure 5: Sales of German Manufacturing Affiliates in Latin America Compared with
Affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe, by sector, 2001




























Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank; author’s calculations.
Differences in sector structure can lead to various conclusions. On the one hand, it seems that
Latin American locations were not able to participate in and profit from the rapidly expanding
internationalization of German service firms, and did not profit from the diversification in
German manufacturing FDI that took place in worldwide operations.
11 On the other hand, the
data seem to indicate that German firms were not able to fully take advantage of Latin Ameri-
                                                
11  One of the few examples of sector diversification in Latin America is the rapidly increasing production in
the field of medical and optical instruments.24
can opportunities, and only to a limited extent participated in privatization programs, for ex-
ample in public utilities. However, if rapidly expanding worldwide German FDI is taken into
account, the former view seems to be more realistic. That is, potential German investors were
not outcompeted in Latin America; they rather favored locations in other parts of the world.
12
This holds to a lesser degree for traditional investors from the automobile, chemical, and en-
gineering industries. Hence, the main conclusion seems to be that the lack of new investors in
services and other manufacturing industries in Latin America was due to their forms on op-
erations in other parts of the world.
7 ADJUSTING PRODUCTION NETWORKS: FROM MARKET
ORIENTATION TO NETWORK STRATEGIES
Latin American affiliates of German firms traditionally are considered to be largely market-
oriented and not actors in cross-border production networks based on division of labor. This is
mostly shown by structural indicators, such as a bias of FDI toward large and high-income
markets as well as by the correlation of foreign production and foreign trade. The rest of this
section describes examples of adjustments in production networks.
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Source:  World Bank (2003); Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a); author’s calculations.
                                                
12  It should be stressed, however, that a changed focus of FDI does not mean disinterest in Latin America.
German investors there put much emphasis on increasing productivity. Compared with the situation in 1998,
they could maintain their productivity advantage versus other developing regions and narrow the difference
to highly developed countries (see Jungnickel and Shams 2001 and Annex Table A.1).25
Figure 6 clearly shows the large-country bias of German production in Latin America. The
figure shows a positive correlation between German employment and the size of the host
country, which is not surprising since large countries should normally have greater potential
to receive FDI. The figure also demonstrates that even the share of FDI in the host economy,
as measured by the share of the workforce, is positively related to the size of the host country
(as measured by the workforce). This result is largely in line with the analyses of Nunnen-
kamp (2003) and Wezel (2003), although there are differences in details.
13  Similarly, in Fig-
ure 7, there is a highly significant positive correlation between the employment share of Ger-
man investors and the income level in the host country.  This could indicate that market and
not cost considerations are the main motive for FDI.
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Source:  World Bank (2003); Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a); author’s calculations.
Comparing the foreign production of German firms in 2001 with trade flows between Ger-
many and the respective host regions reveals that there has been little change in the domi-
nance of local production over trade since the late 1990s (Jungnickel and Shams 2001). Par-
ticularly in the sectors dominating German production in the region, production values are
manifold trade values, although German imports from the main production countries in-
                                                
13  Nunnenkamp (2003) finds no large-country bias of (worldwide) FDI in Latin America if the analysis con-
trols for the size of host economies. This difference compared with my findings could result from two fac-
tors: dominance of U.S. FDI in the region and use of FDI data that could be substantially distorted by the fi-
nancing strategies of the investors. Wezel (2003) studies the determinants of German FDI (as opposed to
sales values of the affiliates) in the 10 largest Latin American countries. He finds that FDI normalized by
size of the host country is significantly determined by the aim to overcome tariff barriers, and is rather
negatively related to the income level of the host economy.26
creased faster than local production. In the other Latin American countries (excluding Argen-
tina, Brazil, or Mexico), production has also become more important compared with trade
(Figure 8). This leads to the presumption that German production in Latin America is a sub-
stitute rather than a complement to trade, although this might depend on the sector.
Figure 8: German Production in, and Trade with, Latin America, 2001








Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a); Statistisches Bundesamt; author’s calculations.
The below-average relative weight of trading companies also indicates a weak relationship
between foreign production and trade with Germany. Often the trading companies are distri-
bution outlets of manufacturing firms. In developing countries other than Latin America, sales
of German-owned trading companies are close to 60 percent of German-owned production. In
Latin America sales reach a mere 13 percent. In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are special
cases, where sales of manufacturing affiliates are 10 (Brazil) and even 17 (Mexico) times the
sales of trading companies. The employees of manufacturing affiliates outnumber those
working with German trading affiliates by a factor of 24. This indicates that German firms,
which in an international comparison have above-average export orientation, engage in Brazil
by way of local production rather than by trade.
However, neither the large-country bias of production nor the missing complementarity of
trade with Germany reveals anything about the (possible) specialization and division of labor
in Latin America or between Latin America and North America. For example, it may be that
FDI in large countries at the same time serves domestic and neighboring markets. Although
there is no comprehensive information available on this issue, the evidence from individual27
firms clearly points to a trend toward cross-border production networking, which was already
observable in the late 1990s (Jungnickel and Shams 2001).
Mexican plants have progressed furthest in this respect. Production of automobiles is largely
directed to the North American market. Volkswagen’s export quota is in the area of 80 per-
cent. VW of Mexico had sales of US$ 7 billion in 2000 (FTD 30.08.2001). The Daimler-
Chrysler plant won the location decision for production of the PT Cruiser with a cost advan-
tage of US$ 2,000 versus Austria (FAZ 13.12.2001). Following currency devaluation, the
Brazilian and Argentine plants have also increased their position in international production
networks.
VW of Brazil, in competition with Spanish, Portuguese, and Slovakian plants, was awarded
the contract to manufacture the Tupi (FAZ 12.05.2003). Relocations from Europe to Latin
America are promoted by the strong Euro and the weak real (FTD 20.08.2001), as well as by
the general trend toward platform strategies. And the best-selling model Gol is especially
manufactured for the Latin American market. The Resende plant for the manufacture of light
trucks is considered one of the most efficient on a worldwide scale, with the most important
subcontractors integrated into the production process.
Latin American VW plants (including a minor South African plant) lost €600 million in busi-
ness to third parties in 2001, but were able to increase sales to affiliated companies in other
regions by €360 million. Exports were and still are the main, sometimes the only, stabilization
factor. The export quota of the Resende light truck plant is planned to more than double
within three years from 10 percent to 25 percent by 2005 (FTD 20.08.2001). With exports of
160,000 cars from Brazil, VW achieved a new export record. Most of these cars go to Mex-
ico. The Siemens plants in Brazil have been given responsibility for the entire Mercosur area.
Daimler-Chrysler partly likewise compensated for weak domestic demand in crisis countries
by increasing exports. Had there not been the export option, the Argentine plant would have
had to close (HB 13.2.2003). Similarly, the newly erected Brazilian plant was given assembly
of the C-class model for the U.S. market because the plant had been used at less than half ca-
pacity due to disappointing production of the A-class for the domestic market (FR 14.8.2001).
Daimler is working on “global modularization” of production.
ZF Friedrichshafen, an automobile supplier with 13 production locations in Latin America (in
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) and 119 worldwide, has established a network based on spe-
cialization in Mercosur and NAFTA. The Mexican plants not only supply shock absorbers28
and clutches to the United States, they are also engaged in the reciprocal exchange of
clutches, shock absorbers, and torque converters with the Brazilian and Argentine plants. Part
of the Argentine production was relocated to Brazil.
Beiersdorf AG, which specializes in cosmetics, health care, and adhesives (strong interna-
tional brands are, among others, Nivea, Atrix, Juvena, TESA, and Hansaplast), has 1,400 of
its 18,000 employees in Latin America. Production units in Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and
Brazil are increasingly specialized. A division of labor in Latin America and NAFTA has
been established. This drive for efficiency (which is a worldwide policy of the company)
makes the individual subsidiaries less dependent on their home market, although location de-
cisions are largely determined by long-term local market perspectives. Temporary crises and
exchange rate changes are less relevant.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In view of the economic and political crises in certain Latin American countries, changes in
the volume of German FDI in the region have been surprisingly small. Although the profit-
ability of subsidiaries in crisis countries decreased rapidly, with losses recorded in the most
recent year for which data are available, German firms neither retreated from Latin America
on a massive scale nor seized the opportunity to buy local firms at a low price, following de-
valuation. The share of Latin American locations in total German FDI decreased slightly only
in the most recent years, and this was essentially a result of expansion elsewhere. Substantial
reductions in employment in Latin American subsidiaries took place before the crises became
evident. This indicates that German investors take a rather long-term view in the region.
The structure of German involvement in Latin America has remained fairly stable, with clear
dominance by the four core manufacturing industries - automobiles, chemicals, mechanical
engineering, and electrical engineering - and the large host countries - Brazil, Mexico, and
Argentina. Mexican locations gained what was lost in Brazil and Argentina. The greatest in-
crease in German FDI took place in Uruguay.
It seems that integration of Latin American operations has gained momentum more recently,
although there is no comprehensive information on that process. The available evidence leads
to the conclusion that it was not only NAFTA (especially Mexico) that attracted more German
FDI (as well as FDI from other sources). Latin American integration has affected specializa-29
tion and the division of labor of the subsidiaries, enabling them to profit from scale economies
and balance national fluctuations in demand.
It can be expected that free trade agreements with the European Union will significantly im-
prove the potential for specialization and result in more FDI. Latin American subsidiaries are
becoming more integrated through cross-border division of labor in automobile manufactur-
ing, with its specialization and platform strategies, and in suppliers and firms from other sec-
tors. However, it is unlikely that Latin America will be the main focus for German FDI in the
short term. Locations in Central and Eastern European countries and China seem to be more
attractive in the foreseeable future. The key to an increase in (German) FDI in Latin America
is to overcome the debt problems and achieve sustainable growth in the region.30
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  Table A.1: New Investment, Disinvestment and Short-term Credit Financing of German FDI in Latin America,
1999-2002 






















































































































1. New investments 1999 172 937 278 233 69 - 8 - 12 1,919 2 519 253
2000 172 905 132 307 16 64 69 - 60 2,095 0 572 248
2001 182 2,184 270 178 25 57 11 27 103 4,985 163 516 337
2002 155 661 378 154 23 6 2 17 13 1,822 286 540 208
2. Disinvestment 1999 110 174 85 0 0 - 0 - 0 811 3 85 110
2000 518 214 177 0 0 0 0 - 0 1,043 0 177 518
2001 166 1,539 341 5 0 30 8 18 126 2,716 0 384 310
2002 34 219 55 7 1 39 0 10 18 647 236 101 63
3. Balance 1999 -62 -763 -193 -233 -69 -65 -8 68 -12 -1,108 239 -434 -143
2000 346 -691 45 -307 -16 -64 -69 -103 -60 -1,052 -25 -395 270
2001 -16 -645 71 -173 -25 -27 -3 -9 23 -2,269 -1,388 -132 -27
2002 -121 -442 -323 -147 -22 33 -2 -7 5 -1,175 -67 -439 -145
4. Short-term loans 1999 156 -339 -88 -18 0 56 -18 7 -12 -684 -434 -68 151
2000 -54 -161 -295 -13 -11 -22 0 -38 6 -5,553 -4,935 -330 -97
2001 94 173 -316 28 8 16 4 -18 -22 -1,461 -1,443 -268 62
2002 -22 126 649 51 -22 -57 -7 41 -5 2,668 1,821 636 -8
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Table A.1: New Investment, Disinvestment and Short-term Credit Financing of German FDI
in Latin America, 1999-2002 






















































































































5. Total FDI flow
(=3+4)
1999 94 -1,102 -281 -251 -69 -9 -26 75 -24 -1,792 -195 -502 8
2000 292 -852 -250 -320 -27 -86 -69 -141 -54 -6,605 -4,960 -725 173
2001 78 -472 -245 -145 -17 -11 1 -27 1 -3,730 -2,831 -400 35
2002 -143 -316 326 -96 -44 -24 -9 34 0 1,493 1,754 197 -153
6. Disinv./new inv.
(=2/1)
1999 0.64 0.19 0.31 - - - - - - 0.42 1.50 0.16 0.43
2000 3.01 0.24 1.34 - - - - - - 0.50 - 0.31 2.09
2001 0.91 0.70 1.26 0.03 - 0.53 0.73 0.67 1.22 0.54 - 0.74 0.92
2002 0.22 0.33 0.15 0.05 0.04 6.50 0.00 0.59 1.38 0.36 0.83 0.19 0.30
7. Short-term
loans/FDI (=4/5)
1999 1.66 0.31 0.31 0.07 - -6.22 0.69 0.09 0.50 0.38 2.23 0.14 18.88
2000 -0.18 0.19 1.18 0.04 0.41 0.26 - 0.27 -0.11 0.84 0.99 0.46 -0.56
2001 1.21 -0.37 1.29 -0.19 -0.47 -1.45 4.00 0.67 -22.00 0.39 0.51 0.67 1.77
2002 0.15 -0.40 1.99 -0.53 0.50 2.38 0.78 1.21 - 1.79 1.04 3.23 0.05
a minus sign (-) indicates export of capital from Germany.
* Virgin Islands, Bahamas, Bermudas, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Panama; **   Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay; ***  Chile,
Peru, Ecuador, Mexico.
“-” Data unavailable.
Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (2003); author’s calculations.
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Figure A.1: The Productivity of German Affiliates in Latin America Compared
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Note: Productivity is measured as sales per employee in manufacturing affiliates in 1000 Euro.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; author’s calculations.